

FILED  
U.S. DISTRICT COURT  
BRUNSWICK DIV.

2011 DEC 14 AM 10:11

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA  
STATESBORO DIVISION

*Paul*  
SO. DIST. OF GA.

MARVIN TURNER,

Plaintiff,

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO.: CV611-098

DANE DASHER; JOHN PAUL; LARRY  
BREWTON; Officer DEKELE; Officer  
LANE; Officer KING; Officer LILLIARD;  
Officer THOMAS; Sgt. SMITH; Officer  
GORDON; Lt. SANDERS; Officer  
TOOTLE; Officer MOBLEY; Officer  
WADE; Officer HURTADO; Officer  
BERRY; and DON JARRIEL,

Defendants.

**ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION**

Plaintiff, who is currently housed at Ware State Prison in Waycross, Georgia, filed a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contesting certain conditions of his confinement while he was housed at Georgia State Prison in Reidsville, Georgia. The undersigned informed Plaintiff that the claims he set forth in his Complaint appeared to be unrelated and directed Plaintiff to advise the Court as to which related claims he wished to pursue. Plaintiff responded to that Order, and based on his response, it appears that Plaintiff does not wish to pursue his claims against Defendants Thomas, Dekele, Lane, King, and Lilliard stemming from events which allegedly occurred on

August 25, 2009, and his claims against Defendants Brewton, Paul, and Dasher, except as below noted. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Dekele, Lane, King, and Lilliard should be **DISMISSED**, without prejudice. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Thomas stemming from August 25, 2009, events should also be **DISMISSED**.

A prisoner proceeding in a civil action against officers or employees of government entities must comply with the mandates of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 & 1915A. In determining compliance, the court shall be guided by the longstanding principle that *pro se* pleadings are entitled to liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Walker v. Dugger, 860 F.2d 1010, 1011 (11th Cir. 1988).

28 U.S.C. § 1915A requires a district court to screen the complaint for cognizable claims before or as soon as possible after docketing. The court must dismiss the complaint or any portion of the complaint that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2).

In Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997), the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the language contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which is nearly identical to that contained in the screening provisions at § 1915A(b). As the language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) closely tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court held that the same standards for determining whether to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) should be applied to prisoner complaints filed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Mitchell, 112 F.3d at 1490. While the court in

Mitchell interpreted § 1915(e), its interpretation guides this court in applying the identical language of § 1915A.

Plaintiff contends that Defendant Sanders, Tootle, Mobley, Wade, Hurtado, Thomas, and Berry came into his cell to carry out Defendant Jarriel's order to extract Plaintiff from his cell by whatever force was necessary to take Plaintiff to the hospital floor to be forcibly given a tuberculosis skin test. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Sanders pepper-sprayed him in a non-ventilated area, and then other officers shot "pepper-ball projectiles" which hit Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 8, p. 3). Plaintiff also contends that Defendant Sanders ordered hands-on force to be used against Plaintiff. Plaintiff avers that he was shocked by an electric shock shield, had his arms and legs twisted, was put in a choke hold, and slammed onto the concrete floor. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Jarriel, Smith, and Gordon were present during this incident. Plaintiff contends that he was dragged to the hospital floor and refused to have the skin test. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Jarriel ordered officers to take Plaintiff back to his cell and place him on stripped cell status. Plaintiff alleges that he was placed in his cell without a mattress, blanket, sheets, hygiene products, or clothing, and it was extremely cold. Plaintiff contends that he was transferred not long after this incident as punishment for filing a grievance.

It is a well-settled principle that "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977) (internal quotes omitted)).

Further, it is not necessary that a correctional officer actually participate in the use of excessive force in order to be held liable under section 1983. Rather, "an officer who is present at the scene and who fails to take reasonable steps to protect [a] victim of" the "use of excessive force can be held liable for his nonfeasance." See Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Fundiller v. City of Cooper, 777 F.2d 1436, 1442 (11th Cir. 1985)).

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment, and requires that states not impose punishments that shock the conscience, involve unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, offend evolving notions of decency, or are grossly disproportionate to the offense for which they are imposed. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976). The Supreme Court has recognized that under the Eighth Amendment, "conditions of confinement . . . may make intolerable an otherwise constitutional term of imprisonment." Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 669 n.38.

"To state a First Amendment claim for retaliation, a prisoner need not allege violation of a separate and distinct constitutional right." Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). Rather, "[t]he gist of a retaliation claim is that a prisoner is penalized for exercising the right of free speech." Id. A prisoner can establish retaliation by demonstrating that the prison official's actions were "the result of his having filed" a grievance "concerning the conditions of his imprisonment." See id.

These allegations, when read in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, arguably state colorable claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A against Defendants Jarriel, Sanders, Tootle, Mobley, Wade, Hurtado, Thomas, and Berry. A copy of Plaintiff's Complaint and a copy of this Order shall be served upon Defendants

Jarriel, Sanders, Tootle, Mobley, Wade, Hurtado, Thomas, and Berry by the United States Marshal without prepayment of cost. If any Defendant elects to file a Waiver of Reply, then he or she must file either a dispositive motion or an answer to the complaint within thirty (30) days of the filing of said Waiver of Reply.

Plaintiff also states that Defendants Gordon, Smith, and other officers confiscated his property on Defendant Jarriel's orders. The intentional deprivation of property gives rise to a Due Process Clause violation when the State fails to provide an adequate post deprivation remedy. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-10-1, Georgia has created a civil cause of action for the wrongful deprivation of personal property. See Byrd v. Stewart, 811 F.2d 554, 555 n.1 (11th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Plaintiff also states that Defendants Jarriel, Dasher, Paul, Brewton, Sanders, and Smith, all of whom were supervisors, failed to stop their subordinates from acting unlawfully. In section 1983 actions, liability must be based on something more than a theory of respondeat superior. Braddy v. Fla. Dep't of Labor & Employment Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 801 (11th Cir. 1998). A supervisor may be liable only through personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between the supervisor's conduct and the alleged violations. Id. at 802. As Plaintiff has failed to make this basic showing against Defendants Dasher, Paul, and Brewton, his claims against Defendants Dasher, Paul, and Brewton should be dismissed.

#### **INSTRUCTIONS TO DEFENDANTS**

Since the Plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis, service must be effected by the United States Marshal. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(2). In most cases, the

marshal will first mail a copy of the complaint to the Defendants by first-class mail and request that the Defendants waive formal service of summons. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d); Local Rule 4.5. Individual and corporate defendants have a duty to avoid unnecessary costs of serving the summons, and any such defendant who fails to comply with the request for waiver must bear the costs of personal service unless good cause can be shown for the failure to return the waiver. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(2). Generally, a defendant who timely returns the waiver is not required to answer the complaint until sixty (60) days after the date that the marshal sent the request for waiver. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(3).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants are hereby granted leave of court to take the deposition of the Plaintiff upon oral examination. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a). The Defendants shall ensure that the Plaintiff's deposition and any other depositions in the case are taken within the 140-day discovery period allowed by this court's local rules. Local Rule 26.1(d)(i).

In the event Defendants take the deposition of any other person, they are ordered to comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30 as set forth herein. As the Plaintiff will likely not be in attendance for such a deposition, the Defendants shall notify Plaintiff of the deposition and advise him that he may serve on the Defendants, in a sealed envelope, within ten (10) days of the notice of deposition, written questions the Plaintiff wishes to propound to the witness, if any. The Defendants shall present such questions to the witness seriatim during the deposition. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c).

## **INSTRUCTIONS TO PLAINTIFF**

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon their attorneys, a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed with the Clerk of Court a certificate stating the date on which a true and correct copy of any document was mailed to Defendants or counsel. FED. R. CIV. P. 5. "Every pleading shall contain a caption setting forth the name of the court, the title of the action, [and] the file number." FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a). Any paper received by a district judge or magistrate judge which has not been filed with the Clerk or which fails to include a caption or a certificate of service will be disregarded by the court and returned to the sender.

Plaintiff is charged with the responsibility of immediately informing this Court and defense counsel of any change of address during the pendency of this action. Local Rule 11.1. Failure to do so may result in dismissal of this case.

Plaintiff has the responsibility for pursuing this case. For example, if Plaintiff wishes to obtain facts and information about the case from Defendants, Plaintiff must initiate discovery. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26, et seq. Plaintiff does not need the permission of the court to begin discovery, and Plaintiff should begin discovery promptly and complete it within 140 days after the filing of the answer. Local Rule 26.1(d)(I).

Interrogatories are a practical method of discovery for incarcerated persons. See FED. R. CIV. P. 33. Interrogatories may be served only on a party to the litigation, and, for the purposes of the instant case, this means that interrogatories should not be directed to persons or organizations who are not named as Defendants. Interrogatories

shall not be filed with the court. Local Rule 26.4. Interrogatories are not to contain more than twenty-five (25) questions. FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a). If Plaintiff wishes to propound more than twenty-five (25) interrogatories to a party, Plaintiff must have permission of the court. If Plaintiff wishes to file a motion to compel, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, he should first contact the attorneys for the Defendants and try to work out the problem; if Plaintiff proceeds with the motion to compel, he should also file a statement certifying that he has contacted opposing counsel in a good faith effort to resolve any dispute about discovery. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); 37(a)(2); Local Rule 26.5. Plaintiff has the responsibility for maintaining his own records of the case. If Plaintiff loses papers and needs new copies, he may obtain them from the Clerk of Court at the standard cost of fifty (\$.50) cents per page.

If Plaintiff does not press his case forward, the court may dismiss it for want of prosecution. FED. R. CIV. P. 41; Local Rule 41.1.

It is the Plaintiff's duty to cooperate fully in any discovery which may be initiated by the Defendants. Upon no less than five (5) days notice of the scheduled deposition date, the Plaintiff shall appear and permit his deposition to be taken and shall answer, under oath or solemn affirmation, any question which seeks information relevant to the subject matter of the pending action. Failing to answer questions at the deposition or giving evasive or incomplete responses to questions will not be tolerated and may subject Plaintiff to severe sanctions, including dismissal of this case.

As the case progresses, Plaintiff may receive a notice addressed to "counsel of record" directing the parties to prepare and submit a Joint Status Report and a Proposed Pretrial Order. A plaintiff proceeding without counsel may prepare and file a



unilateral Status Report and is required to prepare and file his own version of the Proposed Pretrial Order. A plaintiff who is incarcerated shall not be required or entitled to attend any status or pretrial conference which may be scheduled by the court.

**ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS TO PLAINTIFF REGARDING MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

Under this Court's Local Rules, a party opposing a motion to dismiss shall file and serve his response to the motion within fourteen (14) days of its service. "Failure to respond shall indicate that there is no opposition to a motion." Local Rule 7.5. Therefore, if you fail to respond to a motion to dismiss, the Court will assume that you do not oppose the Defendants' motion.

Your response to a motion for summary judgment must be filed within twenty one (21) days after service of the motion. Local Rules 7.5, 56.1. The failure to respond to such a motion shall indicate that there is no opposition to the motion. Furthermore, each material fact set forth in the Defendants' statement of material facts will be deemed admitted unless specifically controverted by an opposition statement. Should the Defendants file a motion for summary judgment, you are advised that you will have the burden of establishing the existence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact in this case. That burden cannot be carried by reliance on the conclusory allegations contained within the complaint. Should the Defendants' motion for summary judgment be supported by affidavit, you must file counter-affidavits if you desire to contest the Defendants' statement of the facts. Should you fail to file opposing affidavits setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial, the consequences are these: any factual assertions made in Defendants' affidavits will be accepted as true

and summary judgment will be entered against the Plaintiff pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

**SO ORDERED** and **REPORTED** and **RECOMMENDED**, this 14<sup>th</sup> day of December, 2011.



JAMES E. GRAHAM  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE